ATLANTIC COUNCIL by Atlantic Council experts October 4, 2024
A year into the Gaza war, the conflict has left deep political, security, and societal scars across the Middle East and North Africa. The war was ignited by an unprecedented terrorist attack by Hamas on Israel on October 7, 2023 in which militants killed some 1,200 people and took 251 hostages97 of whom are still being held hostage one year later, with approximately one-third of that group already believed to be dead. The attack prompted Israel's strongest response in decades, with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launching airstrikes and a ground invasion aimed at dismantling Hamas and its capabilities that continue to this day.
The Gaza Strip, which has been ruled by Hamas since 2007 and under an Israeli blockade for nearly two decades, has suffered widespread destruction and heavy damage to its infrastructure. Since the war began, some 41,000 people have been killed, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. The humanitarian situation in Gaza has reached catastrophic levels, with Gazans facing massive food shortages, the spread of disease, and the displacement of 1.9 million people from their homes.
International efforts at the United Nations to calm tensions have been ineffectual, and the decision by the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to seek arrest warrants against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar has been met with fury in Israel and derision by Hamas. The United States, Qatar, and Egypt had early success in November 2023 in securing a ceasefire and freeing some hostages, but since then the conflict has continued unabated, leaving the region in a fragile state and possibly veering toward wider regional conflict.
The potential for a direct conflict between Israel and Iran has never been higher following Iran's firing of almost two hundred ballistic missiles at the beginning of October, an event preceded by the Islamic Republic's April barrage of over three hundred missiles and drones. Houthi rebels in Yemen have spent months intermittently launching missiles into Israel while consistently attacking Western shipping lines in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb Strait. And daily skirmishes along the Israel-Lebanon border have led to dozens of deaths in both countries over the last year. It may be a prelude to a broader war—the likelihood of which greatly increased following Israel's September killing of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah and its ground invasion of southern Lebanon.
One year on, the Gaza War remains unresolved and the potential for war across the region is becoming more likely. So what is the humanitarian situation on the ground? Will Saudi-Israeli diplomatic normalization materialize? What does the future of the Abraham Accords look like? Is there a regional war around the corner? Fourteen experts from across the Atlantic Council take on these questions in a series of short essays below.
Navigate our coverageIsrael's relations with the United States
Israel has settled into a routine known colloquially as the new normal, where the fabric of daily life is interwoven with threads of ever-present crisis. One year since the brutal October 7, 2023, massacre wrought by Hamas, and amid the repercussions of that day's devastating aftermath—including multiple hot battlefronts, constant dread over the fate of the captives in Gaza, and extended tours of reserve duty—Israelis are abiding a split-screen existence. They go about their regular business while simultaneously perceiving that the nation's calendar will be stuck hopelessly on October 8, 2023.
A similar, schizophrenic rhythm pervades Israel's relationship with its main benefactor, the United States, as matters of critical substance are intermingled tightly with considerations of domestic politics. On the one hand, the two countries remain aligned closely in their commitment to ensuring Israel's security: The Joe Biden administration has come singularly to Israel's aid with invaluable military, intelligence, and diplomatic assistance, thereby enabling the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to persist in the effort to dismantle Hamas's infrastructure and to defend against other threats, from Lebanon and Syria to Yemen and Iran. On the other hand, and at the same time, that cooperation has come under heavy assault from various constituencies in the United States and Israel, who charge that Washington has been either excessively or insufficiently supportive of its embattled ally.
These conflicting realities complicate an already problematic environment where tensions have surfaced regularly over the precise manner in which the Benjamin Netanyahu government has pursued its objectives. US initiatives to promote a hostage release and ceasefire deal in Gaza, bring a halt to fighting across the Israel-Lebanon border, institutionalize an emerging US Central Command-led regional defense architecture, and possibly deepen Israel's integration into the wider region have stalled as Israel gives precedence to continuing IDF manoeuvre in neighboring theaters of operation and resists attempts to cede control to other foreign auspices. The volatility of the current political moment—with impending elections in the US and coalition instability in Israel—amplifies these fraught dynamics.
The predicament facing Israel is almost certain to grow more acute when the next US administration assumes power in January 2025. With more questions than answers about the path forward, both presidential candidates have resorted to issuing impatient calls for Israel to draw its Gaza campaign to a close. Under these circumstances, the prime minister would be wise to hasten and proceed toward an endgame that allows Israel to ground its relations with the United States' next president—a vital component in Israel's national security—on a more positive footing.
Shalom Lipner is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative who previously worked in foreign policy and public diplomacy during his time at the Prime Minister's Office in Jerusalem, where he served in the administration of seven consecutive Israeli premiers.