Most Lebanese blame the current war there, which they do not want,as much on Hizbullahs recklessness including Hassan Nasrallahs miscalculationsas on Israel's brutality.
IISSEmile Hokayem@emile_hokayem12 December 2024
The killing by Israel on 27 September 2024 of Hassan Nasrallah, who had served as Lebanese Hizbullahs charismatic leader since 1992, is a turning point not just for the organisation he led, but for Lebanon and indeed the whole of the Levant, as we'll as for Irans strategy of influence. For three decades, he did more than anyone else to shape, through guile and violence, both his countries politics and the security dynamics of the broader Levantine region.The more Nasrallah grew in stature, the more formidable Hizbullah seemed. Equipped with advanced missile capabilities and uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs), and battle-hardened through its many regional adventures, the Shia militant group was often described (including by this author) as the Middle Easts most powerful non-state actor. Enabled by Iran and dominant in Lebanon, the group dislodged Israel from southern Lebanon in 2000 and fought it to a standstill in 2006. Later, it came to the rescue of the Assad regime in Syria, mentored Iraqi militias and assisted the Houthis rise in Yemen. Among Tehrans constellation of partners, Nasrallah came second only to Ali Khamenei, Irans supreme leader, and was an equal of Qassem Soleimani, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force commander who was killed by the United States in 2020.Still, he proved no match for Israel's superior intelligence and air capabilities. In a matter of weeks, starting with the killing of Fuad Shukr, Hizbullahs most senior military commander, in July 2024, Israel decapitated the groups upper- and mid-level echelons. The tally of killed leaders includes members of the tight-knit guerrilla and terrorist group that began rising through the ranks in the 1980s, such as Ibrahim Aqil. (Its two most famous members, Imad Mughniyeh and Mustafa Badreddine, had already been killed by Israel in 2008 and 2016 respectively.) If not yet broken, Hizbullah is definitely weakened. It is struggling militarily against an Israeli enemy that has moved ruthlessly against it, and has been damaged by its apparent weakness and dimming reputation.
An unwanted war
How did this happen? Hizbullahs arrogance, hubris and miscalculations must share in the blame. Hizbullah was not involved in the 7 October 2023 attack on Israel, but it joined the fight out of solidarity with Hamas, hoping for a short war and a political boost for standing with the Palestinians. Hizbullah believed that its calibrated military response, one that was within the rules of escalation that had prevailed in its conflict with Israel since 2006, and its linking of a ceasefire in Gaza to one that would follow in Lebanon, would somehow keep the armed contest under control.In truth, Nasrallah had deeply misread Israel's mood after 7 October. He had calculated that Israel would not risk a two-front war, underestimating how the fear that Hizbullah, a more powerful foe than Hamas, might conduct a similar operation and inflict much greater casualties would shape Israel's resolve. By establishing a linkage with a ceasefire in Gaza that Nasrallah expected but that never came, he effectively cornered himself. He also found out that Iranian involvement in the war would be restrained because Tehran could not risk a slide toward a direct confrontation with the US. He was effectively alone in facing Israel even as he hailed the advent of a unity of fronts among Iran-backed militias.Above all, this was not the war Hizbullah wanted, nor was it the one it was designed to fight. Hizbullah was supposed to be a strategic force that would deter Israel and mentor and guide other Iranian-backed militias in the region. Its full force was to be deployed in case Irans territory, nuclear sites or leadership came under Israeli or US attack, not in the service of a fellow militia in occupied Gaza. Its war-fighting concept assumed a rapid and violent conflict that would include a massive exchange of missiles, rockets and drones to overwhelm Israeli air defences, accompanied by intense ground operations. Hizbullahs occasional display of technological prowess in the current conflict, such as sending a drone over the port of Haifa and other critical facilities, and destroying several Israeli military assets, gave a taste of what the movement hoped to achieve. In its 2006 war with Israel, Hizbullah fired a daily average of 124 rockets; Israeli and independent studies estimated it could fire as many as 3,000 in the current war. This would have paralysed life in Israel, stunning its population and forcing a climbdown that would have inevitably been interpreted as a success by Hizbullah.Instead, for 11 months and counting, Hizbullah has been caught in an Israeli-dictated campaign of attrition of ever-higher intensity based on superior intelligence-gathering and airpower, which has imposed high costs on Hizbullahs command-and-control structure and weapons stockpiles. This was the war the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had been prepared to fight since 2006, one for which Hizbullah had no answer. Israel's superior air defences, combined with Hizbullahs own inability to articulate escalatory steps that aligned with its reluctance to risk an all-out war, left the group behind in the air war. With fighting in Gaza becoming less intense, Israel could devote more attention and military resources to its northern front. Between October 2023 and August 2024, for every projectile Hizbullah fired at Israel, Israel fired four. Importantly, Hizbullah fired far fewer rockets and missiles than expected. Whether this was because of its self-imposed restraint, the destruction of its capabilities or a mixture of both will remain unclear until the end of the war. In any case, the damage inflicted on Israel has been limited compared to expectations. As of October 2024, Israel's critical infrastructure remained largely unharmed, though 80,000 Israeli residents could not return to their homes in northern Israel. In contrast, over a million Lebanese we're displaced, while critical infrastructure and dozens of southern villages we're partially or totally destroyed.All of this has caused Hizbullahs carefully curated image to take a beating. The incredible penetration of its security apparatus, which led to the detonation of members pagers and walkie-talkies on 1718 September, followed in rapid succession by the elimination of nearly its entire command structure, suggests internal betrayals, abysmal security protocols and communications weaknesses.
In his last televised speech on 19 September, a tired-looking and at times humbled Nasrallah seemed to finally understand that his attempt to restore deterrence against Israel was not working. But he still cast his ability to deny Israel its stated objective the return of Israeli residents to their homes in northern Israel as a success. He believed that he had properly assessed Israel's risk appetite and seemed confident that escalation could be managed.
Ten days later, a massive air-bombing operation killed him and other senior commanders, including a senior Iranian Quds Force visitor. The intensification of the Israeli air campaign and limited raids across Lebanons southern regions depopulated large swathes of territory, creating an overwhelming displacement crisis. By late October, Israel still had not mounted a large-scale ground operation. Instead, it remained focused on destroying Hizbullahs military infrastructure in the area south of the Litani River. Israel was also degrading the civilian infrastructure in the area so as to make it impossible for the civilian population to return in the near term. This scorched-earth approach represents a departure from its behaviour during its two-decade occupation of Lebanon and suggests a different security model than straight-up occupation.Hizbullahs surviving commanders appear to have relinquished their predecessors caution and are firing more projectiles at Israel. They have also had to defend against a ground campaign with diminished capabilities, hoping that their preparations, knowledge of the field and agile structure will withstand the Israeli onslaught. The number of Hizbullahi and Israeli casualties in southern Lebanon remains unclear, but the IDF has suffered more significant losses and lost more materiel than in Gaza.
Into the unknown
Nasrallahs death and Hizbullahs weakening have pushed Lebanon into the unknown. Nasrallahs immediate successor, Hashem Safi al-Din, was killed only weeks later. Naim Qassem, who was announced in early November, is a hardline cleric who will have to consolidate what is left of the group while dealing with a tremendous rout. Beyond seeking to ensure Hizbullahs survival, he will try to revive themuqawama(resistance) spirit, invoke Nasrallahs ghost to mobilise his constituency and look for support in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. Importantly, he will have to negotiate a new partnership with Iran. Nasrallah had significant political and strategic autonomy because he was trusted and valued by Tehran. Seeing its main partner so battered, the Quds Force appears to have asserted greater operational and strategic control over Hizbullah. Many Hizbullah sympathisers blame Iran for its lack of support and strategic clarity; they also suspect that Irans lax security protocols are to blame for the intelligence breaches. But the organisation will not be able to rebuild its military and financial strength, nor uphold its ideology, without an Iranian commitment.The war, unwanted by most Lebanese citizens, has been blamed as much on Hizbullahs recklessness as on Israel's brutality. Many Lebanese do not want to shoulder the risks and costs of Hizbullahs gambles. The fact that Nasrallah so badly misread Israel's intentions and capabilities, at the cost of his own life, has given fodder to his many detractors. There is considerable displeasure with even hatred for the Shia movement and how it has forced itsmuqawamaagenda onto the country through threats, coercion, assassinations and bloody regional adventures, and how it aligned itself with Irans priorities and policies. According to the 2024 Arab Barometer, while nearly 80% of Lebanese Shiites believed that Hizbullah is good for the Arab world, only 12% of Sunnis, 11% of Christians and 16% of Druzes agreed.Even as it lost allies prior to the war, Hizbullah remained the organising force of Lebanese politics. It dictated political life and, when needed, threatened its rivals. The degree to which it can continue to do so in the face of recent military and reputational setbacks will help shape the next phase of the conflict. Hizbullahs new leadership has already tried to intimidate its local rivals: Qassem reaffirmed the linkage between the war and a ceasefire in Gaza, and ruled out any decision on key matters such as Lebanons presidential election or the deployment of the military to southern Lebanon until a ceasefire is reached. Even so, other political forces are beginning to challenge its hegemony and to explore alternative political and security arrangements. Lebanese politicians understand that the US remains essential to reaching a sustainable ceasefire despite Washingtons support for the Israeli campaign, and have publicly called for the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, which would remove Hizbullah forces from southern Lebanon and replace them with Lebanese army and UN forces. Prior to the September escalation, Hizbullah had resisted the full implementation of this resolution, but had agreed to remove some capabilities. These terms are clearly no longer acceptable either to Israel, which is effectively creating new facts on the ground, or to the US, which, after nearly a year of trying to avoid a regional war, has all but embraced the Israeli campaign in the hope that in doing so, it might still moderate Israel's aims. Indeed, Israel has so far refrained from targeting critical infrastructure in non-Hizbullah regions, such as Beiruts airport or electrical and water plants that we're hit in 2006.Beyond the battlefield, Hizbullahs main concern is to secure the well-being and continuous support of its Shia constituency. Nasrallah had presented himself as Lebanons shield against Israel and Shiites shield against other communities. Anger at his death will be directed at Israel, but also at domestic rivals. Many members of the Shia community appear disoriented by Nasrallahs absence and the speed with which Hizbullah has been battered. The sectarian anxieties that underpinned Hizbullahs appeal have crystallised among its supporters, who stand to lose significantly in political status and access to resources and services. Much of Hizbullahs constituency has been forced to flee their homes and seek shelter elsewhere; early solidarity in non-Hizbullah regions is giving way to political recriminations and social tensions. This presages bottom-up internal instability.The Lebanese population has also been sobered to discover that assassinations of political leaders, however divisive, do not translate into political openings, and that callous sectarian gloating poisons communal relations. Regardless of their religious affiliation, Lebanese citizens see Israel's campaign through the prism and horrors of Gaza, and assume that, should Israel invade, it will occupy parts of the country as it has in the past. This would cause further fragmentation of an already fractured Lebanese state and army, and revive Hizbullahs resistance ethos.Indeed, the hope that Lebanons government and military could sweep in and stabilise the situation has been undermined by the fact that both institutions are in their worst shape ever. The country has failed to elect a president since 2022, and its economy has been in shambles since the 2019 financial and banking collapse. For its part, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) readiness has been eroded by low morale, bad pay and a sense of drift. It remains unwilling to take any action that would alienate Hizbullah or pose a risk to force cohesion. Israel has targeted LAF personnel, but the LAF, knowing itself to be outgunned, has been unwilling to respond in case this provokes an escalation it cannot match.Lebanons fate will be set by Israel's ambitions. Israel could calculate that its interests are best served by an occupation of southern Lebanon and a continuous campaign to degrade Hizbullah. The resulting chaos and even state collapse would prevent Hizbullah from regrouping or restoring its military strength because the group would have to focus on the needs of its constituency. This, of course, runs the risk of reviving Hizbullahs cause. Israel could also, with US, European and Arab encouragement, end its campaign and seek a diplomatic settlement that conditions support for Lebanon on state control over southern Lebanon in parallel with an international effort to provide conditional economic assistance if Beirut undertakes the hard political and economic reforms needed. A diminished Hizbullah would then have to answer for its immense political and strategic failures.This article appears in the December 2024January 2025 issue ofSurvival: Global Politics and Strategy.