Council on Foreign Relations — March 8, 2024

Proposal 1: The Future of Gaza

A new proposal for the future of Gaza urges formation of an International Trust for Gaza Reconstruction.

Blog Post by Elliott Abrams - March 8, 2024

The Gaza situation got a lot of attention in the State of the Union speech. I was part of a group that spent several months with two visits to Israel and one to Saudi Arabia, many meetings in both places, and about one hundred zoom meetings with U.S., Israeli, Palestinian, Saudi, Emirati, civilian, military, and security officials devising a Gaza plan.

Called the Gaza Futures Task Force and formed by JINSA and the Vandenberg Coalition, we have published The Day After: A Plan for Gaza and it can be found here: https://vandenbergcoalition.org/the-day-after-a-plan-for-gaza/.

Our five-page action plan can be found here: https://vandenbergcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/The-Day-After-A-Plan-for-Gaza-Action-Plan.pdf.

Very briefly, the plan calls for establishment of an International Trust for Gaza that would funnel funding for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, oversee deradicalization in Gaza, and undertake most governmental functions including provision of security. How will it do that? I urge you to look at the Plan and then the full report.

A brief comment on the President's proposal that the United States assist with a maritime aid plan with a route from Cyprus to Gaza: it's a good idea, and has been discussed for months. It will help increase the amount of aid arriving, and usefully take pressure off both Egyptian and Israeli supply routes.

But there is a huge problem, one that the President did not even address: what happens when the aid arrives in that new port? Who receives it? Who distributes it? The President suggested no plan, nor even ideas, for establishing security in Gaza. Unless he does, the kind of anarchy we see now in Gaza, including attacks on aid convoys, will only grow. He should read the Gaza Futures Task Force Report and Plan.

PROPOSAL 2: Five Alternatives for the Future of Gaza

Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai - June 24, 2024 ESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,287, June 24, 2024

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In this article I will present five alternatives for the future of Gaza. Israel's long-term strategy to ensure its continued existence entails the accomplishment of these goals: destruction of Hamas's military capabilities, abolition of Hamas control in Gaza, and the preservation of good relations with the United States. Less core strategic considerations are the return of the abductees, the crisis on the northern front, relations within the region, and Israel's legitimacy. The alternatives for Gaza's future are: the Hamas option, which is the most problematic; the revitalized Palestinian Authority option; the military-civilian option, which seems the most balanced; the chaos option; and the sovereignty option, which is also very problematic. It is essential to conduct a far-reaching discussion on all these alternatives and to avoid attachment to any one of them.

Discussions about the future of Gaza are being conducted in isolation, without comparative discourse, and the political dimension is causing opinions to harden rather than remain open and flexible. Thus, for example, the head of the INSS Institute wrote on May 29 that "An alternative civil address in Gaza [is] the need of the hour" and opened with the words "There is no time," while Gabi Siboni from the Mishgav Institute said on May 24 that "We need to enter the Strip and take control of all humanitarian aid in Gaza." And so on.

There are several alternatives for the future of Gaza, and in this article I will present five of them. A choice will be made through a comparative discussion of their costs and benefits. Constructive strategic planning creates maximum flexibility for decision makers, and optimal conduct would be to implement close alternatives that all serve Israel's strategic goals.

Before presenting the options, we must define the Israeli goals and interests according to which they will be examined. I propose that Israel's goals and interests should be prioritized thus:

Destroying Hamas's military capability: This is the key strategic need. Israel's long-term position in the region depends on its delivering the clear message that anyone who carries out a criminal attack like that of October 7 will, at the very least, lose their military capabilities and their ability to harm Israel for a very long time.

Abolition of Hamas control in Gaza: Following on from the first consideration, Israel must strive to ensure that any party—especially a terrorist organization—that carries out murderous attacks against Israel will lose its rule and its leaders their lives. Between the statement that it is impossible to eliminate an idea, especially a radical one, and the statement that the existence of Hamas in any form, including a civilian one, should be protested, there are many shades of possibility, a significant one of which should be the abolition of Hamas control.

Relations with the United States: Every alternative should take into account the strategic need to maintain good relations with the United States over time. This is a complex consideration against the background of American domestic politics. There can be disagreements, even difficult ones, with the American administration, but Israeli insistence on its positions should be part of a healthy relationship between the countries despite occasional extreme asymmetry. An Israel that pleases the Americans time and time again will lose its position in the United States. With that said, however, it is important to respect American global interests and help to promote them.

The return of the abductees: This is an important issue, but as it is not an existential necessity, it does not meet the same level of importance as the previous considerations. The return of the abductees is a matter of moral and value considerations but not strategic ones. The reality is that there is no scope for a comprehensive deal with Hamas because Sinwar's personal fate depends on his holding the hostages. He will continue to hold them as long as possible until he has another survival option. Efforts to return the abductees through operational means or through local deals should be continued in every way.

The issue of the northern front and dealings with Iran: This consideration is also complex. Hezbollah has said it will not stop firing on the north and will not allow the return of the displaced residents without the cessation of fighting in Gaza. But for Israel, the cessation of fighting in Gaza without the achievement of its objectives against Hamas would represent serious damage to its deterrence against it and against Iran. This is an impasse that can be resolved with either a wider-scale war, which would severely damage Hezbollah's capabilities; or an informal arrangement that Nasrallah can present as an achievement or as a non-cessation of the fighting while the war in Gaza continues. Because of this impasse, this consideration has been relegated to a relatively low place, though in principle it is more fundamental.

Approaching the moderate regional countries, with an emphasis on Saudi Arabia: The war in Gaza, the escalation with Iran, and the incessant Houthi attacks only strengthen the region's understanding of the need to join forces with Israel. While the delay in implementation stems from public opinion and American interests, it seems that it will eventually continue, and Israel's continued military achievements against Hamas strengthen the likelihood that it will come to fruition. This consideration, therefore, has less influence on the choice between the alternatives.

The issue of Israel's legitimacy: In this area there is a gap. While in the short and medium term Israel's legitimacy is under pressure from international institutions, in the long term, the gap—if not the abyss—between the false and politicized accusations against Israel and the actual situation on the ground will be revealed. Although the war is creating negative images, it is one of the cleanest wars in history in terms of the proportion of combatants to civilians killed and the amount of humanitarian aid entering Gaza. Therefore, despite the need to continue to fight resolutely and place the blame for the consequences on Hamas, in choosing alternatives, this is a less influential concern.

There are second-order considerations. These include resources (the economic cost of each option); legal (Israel's obligations towards Gaza within the framework of international law and how they are realized); and social (the impact on each option on national resilience, though in my view this is included in each consideration). It would be better for these considerations to affect the means of carrying out the preferred option and less the actual choice.

Now that the seven main considerations have been defined, the five alternatives can be defined and examined:

The Hamas alternative: In this option, the fighting in Gaza stops and the IDF withdraws from it in exchange for the release of the abductees and the cessation of fighting in the north. A militarily weakened Hamas returns to control the Strip. This option is being promoted by some of the families of abductees and several opposition elements to the government, and the American administration may also support it for internal political reasons. In examining this choice against the balance of considerations, it is clear that while it might achieve the release of the abductees and the cessation of fighting in the north and might be perceived as a good move in terms of relations with the United States, it would substantially harm Israel's core strategic need to destroy Hamas's military capacity and abolish its control in Gaza. The notion that this option would lead to a comprehensive solution to the issue of the abductees and the Hezbollah challenge is questionable. It is more likely that the fighting would resume under less favorable conditions for Israel.

The revitalized Palestinian Authority alternative: In parallel with continued military damage to the military capabilities of Hamas and its government, a governmental and security alternative would be built that would include a revitalized Palestinian Authority with the integration of local elements and the backing and involvement of a coalition of Arab and Western countries. This nation-building alternative is being promoted by the United States and European countries in apparent collaboration with Arab countries, as we'll as by elements in Israel who give too much weight to the official American position. This option promotes American and possibly regional considerations (it is too early to say whether the Arab position is real or the artificial product of American pressure), but there is a big question mark over how much it would be able to provide a real answer to the core considerations of harming Hamas and preventing its reconstitution. It also provides no broad response to the issues of the abductees and the challenge in the north.

The military-civilian alternative: In this option, Israel continues to hit the Hamas organization, both in its military capabilities and in its governance, until it is sufficiently weakened to allow local Palestinian elements to replace it on the ground, with considerable regional and international backing. This alternative is being promoted by Prime Minister Netanyahu and is reflected in key components of the cabinet's decisions. This option provides a good answer to the core considerations of harming Hamas, and might even be tacitly accepted by the Americans and Arab and international actors. It does not, however, provide a solution to the problems of freeing the abductees and the fighting in the north.

The chaos alternative: Here, Israel continues to strike at the Hamas organization, both in its military capabilities and in its governance, and at the same time allows local, regional and international parties to create governmental alternatives on the ground that may mature into a comprehensive governmental alternative. This option was given expression in the opinion that called (at least at the beginning of the war) for the Somalization of Gaza, meaning a kind of supervised, partially independent nation-building. This alternative would allow Israel to define what would not happen and others to decide what is possible. It provides a good answer to Israel's core considerations in terms of Hamas, but would be difficult for the Americans and the regional and international actors to digest. It also does not solve the problems of the abductees and the north.

The sovereignty alternative: Israel imposes a total military government on Gaza, applies its full military and security control over the Strip, and perhaps occupies and even annexes parts of it. This option is being promoted by the right wing of the government. While it provides a good answer to the core considerations in terms of Hamas and might even bring gains on the issue of the abductees, it would make relations with the United States as we'll as other considerations very difficult.

The alternatives for the future of Gaza clearly entail a complex discussion. It is likely possible to move between alternatives and merge them according to developments. As of today, the option that best balances Israel's considerations is the military-civilian one. The most problematic are the Hamas option and the sovereignty option. It is appropriate and correct to continue a complex comparative discussion on Israel's considerations and the alternatives to achieve them and to avoid perceptual and political attachment to any one of them.

PROPOSAL 3: GAZA FUTURES TASK FORCE (The Vandenberg Coalition, JINSA)

Observations and Action Proposal: The International Trust for Gaza Reconstruction

On October 7, Hamas, as the de facto government of Gaza, launched a war against Israel; but this war also arises from a broader program of Iranian regional aggression. With great determination, the Iranian regime disrupts peace in pursuit of its goals of driving the United States from the Middle East, destroying Israel, and asserting Iranian hegemony. To this end, the Iranian regime provides arms, training, funding, and direction to terrorist armies across the region, intimidates or seeks to overthrow legitimate regional leaders and governments, and actively seeks the extinction of the UN-recognized state of Israel. Any day after or post-war scenario must consider:

  1. Restoring the deterrence and security needs of Israel, both for its own people and its standing as a powerful regional ally and essential component of resisting Iran's ambitions;

  2. Dismantling Hamas as a military and governing force and protecting against its reconstitution through Israel's continued freedom of action against it and against Palestinian Islamic Jihad; and by de-militarizing, de-radicalizing, and improving conditions in Gaza such that major terrorist attacks like October 7 can't and won't happen again;

  3. Drawing upon and empowering Gazans dedicated to a peaceful future;

  4. Recognizing a political horizon and thus securing essential participation and support from the United States and its most powerful and influential Arab partners; and

  5. Countering more generally Iran's aggressive campaign to derail regional peace efforts, including by constraining the threat posed by Hezbollah and resuming progress toward normalizing Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The Israeli and Palestinian people deserve a better life than what Hamas—aided by outside forces—forced upon Gaza: serving as human shields protecting Iranian-backed aggression. The region deserves a better future than Iran strives to impose on others. Restoring a realistic path to a two-state solution can be a part of that better Gazan and regional future and a long-term political horizon for two states should be recognized. In order to move to such a political horizon, the first steps must be reconstruction of Gaza and revamping of the Palestinian Authority (the PA).