Israel Policy Forum
West Bank Settlements
Settlements are Israeli civilian communities, overwhelmingly inhabited by Jews1, in territories acquired by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War that are not under Israeli sovereignty.
While Israeli settlements previously existed in Sinai and the Gaza Strip prior to Israel's withdrawal from those territories (in 1982 and 2005, respectively), today the term is largely used to refer to Israeli communities in the West Bank (also known as Judea and Samaria).2
1There are 33 settlements with registered Arab residents. Ariel has the largest Arab population out of the settlements, with 573 Arab residents (mostly Ariel University students.) Several others, including Maale Adumim, Kfar Etzion, and Givat Zeev, have a few dozen (Shaul Arieli,Deceptive Appearances, 99).
2Some also refer to Israeli communities in the Golan and neighborhoods in East Jerusalem as settlements, but given that Israel has annexed these areas, such communities do not function as settlements under Israeli law.
132
West Bank Settlements (Legal Under Israeli Law)
465,400
Jews Living in West Bank Settlements
20,000+
Jews Living in Illegal West Bank Outposts
Source: Peace Now
There are 127 settlements in the West Bank that have legal statusunder Israeli law.
Legal settlements must be built on state land, have building permits from the government, and be established by a government resolution. Settlements that do not meet those criteria areWest Bank outposts, which are illegal under Israeli law. Most of the world also considers settlements to be illegal under international law.
According to Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics, there are 451,700 Jews living in West Bank settlements as of the year 2020. Between 20,000 and 30,000 more live in illegal West Bank outposts. All settlements are located in Area C, the 60% of the West Bank controlled by Israel. Given that Israel has not annexed the West Bank, Jewish settlements in the territory are not considered by Israel to be under its sovereignty. Emergency regulations renewed every five years extend Israeli criminal and some civil law to Israeli citizens in the West Bank.
Today, one-third of settlers are Haredim, one-third are secular, and the remaining third are religious Zionists.
Goals of the Settlement Enterprise
In allowing and encouraging the establishment of Jewish communities in the West Bank, a disputed territory over which Israel does not exercise sovereignty, the Israeli governments initial priority was security. By placing Israeli civilians in certain areas to solidify Israel's control, Israel sought to ensure that the territorys political future would be consistent with the countries perceived security needs. A civilian settler population could also act as the first line of defense against an invasion. Under this approach, Israel designated certain strategic regions of the West Bank for Jewish settlement while initially forbidding the establishment of civilian communities in more heavily populated areas.
Over time, messianic Religious Zionist ideology developed as a significant driver of the settlement movement, based on the notion of a religious imperative for Jews to settle the entire Land of Israel. Settlements established as part of this religious movement were often placed in regions with a large Palestinian population in order to secure Jewish dominance over the territory, prevent a Palestinian state, and secure the entire West Bank for Israel.
Driven by these two distinct rationales, the settlement movement and the Israeli government sought to achieve the following political goals since post-1967 Jewish settlement in the West Bank began:
To delineate a future border between Israel and a Palestinian entity that reflects Israel's priorities
To disrupt the contiguity of Palestinian communities in the West Bank, especially along the central mountain range running north-south
To establish a significant Jewish population in parts of the West Bank so that if annexed, it would not impact the demographic character of the State of Israel
1/3 of Jews in the West Bank are motivated by religious ideology.
In terms of settlers personal reasons for living in the West Bank, one-third of Jews in the West Bank are motivated by religious ideology, while the rest we're drawn to the region by the potential to improve their quality of life. Of the 127 recognized settlements, 64 we're established for religious reasons, while 63 (home to 67% of Jews in the West Bank) we're built with the motivation to provide a high quality of life.
History of West Bank Settlements
Prior to Israel's founding and the Jordanian occupation of the West Bank, the territory contained several Jewish communities, as we'll as millennia of Jewish history and many of Judaisms holiest sites, such as the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron. Jordan expelled 17,000 Jews from the West Bank during the 1948 war, and when Israel conquered the territory in 1967, it had no Jewish population. The first West Bank settlement was Kfar Etzion, a Jewish community that existed prior to 1948 that Israel reestablished in 1967.
The first decade of Israel's occupation of the West Bank saw the establishment of 32 settlements, primarily in the Jordan Valley and around Jerusalem. Under this eras Labor-led governments, security was the primary rationale for encouraging the establishment of civilian Jewish communities in these areas. The aim was to establish the Jordan River as Israel's eastern security border, encircle the large Palestinian population in the mountain range running north-south through the West Banks center, and widen the narrow approach to Jerusalem. This strategy was in line with the Allon Plan, a proposal developed in the wake of the Six-Day War by then-Labor Minister Yigal Allon to divide the West Bank. The Allon plan imagined Israeli annexation of the eastern flank of the territory and the area surrounding Jerusalem, while the rest of the West Bank, which contained most of the Palestinian population, would be returned to Jordan. Although the Israeli government never formally adopted the plan, it served as an influential vision while Labor was in power, with most settlements during this period established in areas designated for Israeli annexation by the plan.
During the Likud governments of 1977-1984, Israel charted a different course regarding West Bank settlement. Under the Sharon plan, imagined by influential Likud minister Ariel Sharon and adopted by the government in 1977, Israel expanded the areas open for Jewish settlement to include a strip adjacent to the Green Line (western Samaria and Judea) in order to encircle the West Banks Palestinian population, separate it from Israeli Arab communities in the Triangle region, and secure the mountain range overlooking Israel's populous coastal plane. Building on the Allon Plan, the Sharon Plan continued to emphasize a security rationale for West Bank settlement and called for avoiding settling Jews in the more densely populated mountain ridge in the West Banks center (labeled Eastern Judea and Samaria on Map 2).
Shortly after, Matityahu Drobles, the World Zionist Organizations Settlement Division head, presented the government with an initiative known as the Drobles Plan. This plan took West Bank settlement a step further by imagining blocks of settlements throughout the West Bank, with the explicit goal of disrupting the Palestinians demographic contiguity and entrenching Israel's presence throughout the territory. The WZOs Settlement Division was one of the leading drivers of settlement construction during this era.
To that end, this period under the Likud governments of 1977-1984 saw a significant increase in West Bank settlement, the largest share of which were built along the West Banks central ridge and its slopes, rather than the Jordan Valley. The goal of creating these Jewish communities in heavily populated Palestinian areas was to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. Whereas the Labor-era Jordan Valley settlements we're largely agricultural communities inhabited by secular Labor Zionists, most residents of settlements built in the late 70s and early 80s we're adherents of Religious Zionism, driven by a messianic ideology to settle the Land of Israel. Representing this ideological movement, Gush Emunim (the block of the faithful) rose to prominence as the umbrella organization for West Bank settlers.
Israel's Labor-Likud national unity governments from 1984 to 1990 struck a balance between the two sides with regard to West Bank settlement. While the pace of establishing new settlements slowed, new settlements appeared in all four of the Sharon plans zones. Following the Likud government of 1990-1992, which oversaw the creation of just two settlements (both in Samaria), Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabins government issued a decision to halt the establishment of new settlements. Soon after, Israel entered into the Oslo peace process with the Palestinians, which created the Palestinian Authority as an autonomous governing body in the West Bank and Gaza and divided the territories into Areas A (full Palestinian control), B (Palestinian administration with Israeli responsible for security), and C (full Israeli control).
From 1992 through 2020, Israel established a mere seven settlements. However, this period also saw the emergence of over 100 illegal West Bank outposts, constructed without the approval of the Israeli government and illegal under Israeli law. Several have undergone retroactive legalization by the government, often by being recognized as a neighborhood of an existing settlement.
WHY ARE WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS A PROBLEM?
Settlements negatively impact prospectsfor securing a two-state outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
However, the existence of settlements does not negate the possibility of two states.
We haven't yet passed the point of no return.
The size of the settler population does not come closeto threatening the West Banks solid Palestinian majority.
The settler population is not distributed effectivelyto secure Israeli dominance over the territory,especially compared to the Palestinian population.
Contrary to the widespread perception that the settlement movement succeeded in establishing facts on the ground that ensure Israel's dominance over the territory, in fact, the opposite is true.
Settlements are incredibly dependent on Israel-proper. They are not self-sufficient and their residents are reliant on aid and services from within the Green Line.
‣Long distances between settlements and their respective regional council administrative centers, as well as between the settlements themselves, limit interaction and hinder the establishment of Jewish cultural and economic centers within the West Bank.
‣The two largest settlements, Beitar Illit and Modiin Illit, are Haredi communities that are largely irrelevant to the lives of non-Haredi settlers.
‣The settlement system largely consists of small settlements that function as disconnected islands reliant on cities in Israel.
‣In 2014, the average per capita aid from the Israeli government to local authorities in the Judea and Samaria region was NIS 3,762, compared to NIS 2,282 within Israel. Local authorities east of the security barrier received NIS 5,950 per capita on average.
‣In 2017, settlers received on average NIS 1,922 in grants and tax benefits, NIS 1,416 more than the national average.5
Over 500,000 Israelis living in the West Bank and East Jerusalem can expect to remain in their homes, which will be within Israelis de jure borders, under a two-state outcome.
While absorbing this population within Israel's sovereign borders would not come without challenges, it does not come close to posing an insurmountable barrier to a two-state outcome.As a point of comparison, Israel absorbed nearly one million immigrants from the former Soviet Union in the 1990s.
6Shaul Arieli,Deceptive Appearances: Do the Jewish Settlements in the West Bank Negate the Feasibility of the Two-State Solution?,Dfus SefiDagan Ltd. (2020), 203.
7Gilad Hirschberger and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, Profile of the Needs and Desires of Settlers in Judea and Samaria inDeceptive Appearances: Do the Jewish Settlements in the West Bank Negate the Feasibility of the Two-State Solution?, Shaul Arieli (Dfus SefiDagan Ltd., 2020), 244.