Israel Government — 2024

Update: 22/12/24 — Key Developments This Month

Update: 30/9/24 — CONFIRMED: Hamas Commander in Lebanon Doubled as UNRWA School Principal

UNRWA confirmed that the Hamas leader in Lebanon, Fatah Sharif, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, was an UNRWA employee. Sharif doubled as a school principal and headed the UNRWA Teachers' Association in Lebanon. UNRWA chief Lazzarini says he didn't know Sharif was a Hamas commander. Just like he said he didn't know about a Hamas server farm which the IDF uncovered under UNRWA's Gaza HQ, the militarization of UNRWA schools by Hamas and the hundreds of other active terrorists UNRWA employs. The more Israel's claims are proven true, the more Lazzarini dismisses them as "disinformation". He has not fired a single employee for membership in a terrorist organization.

Lazzarini should say what is by now obvious: UNRWA's quasi-state scale and near-total reliance on local staff, which are unique in the UN system, make it indefensible against massive terror infiltration. It is an unsustainable and dangerous anomaly. UNRWA can and should be phased out in Gaza in a responsible manner. Terrorism must be delinked from humanitarian operations.

Update 6/8/24: UN Probe Confirms Participation of UNRWA Staff in 7.10 Massacre

The probe by the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) proves that Israel's assertions about the involvement of UNRWA employees in the October 7 massacre are credible and true. In addition to the nine employees that the UN's investigative team determined we're involved in the October 7 massacre, other workers — about whom the team claimed there was insufficient evidence — we're also involved in the massacre. They are members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the UN must fire them immediately and not sweep the issue under the rug.

By not firing them, the UN Secretary-General and UNRWA's Commissioner General are brazenly demonstrating their determination to continue employing members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad even after having been presented with incriminating evidence to this effect. It is time for donor governments to wake up and stop funneling their taxpayers' money to members of designated terrorist organizations.

Update 31/7/2024: Six Months Have Passed Since the UNRWA-Hamas Scandal Broke

Six months have passed since the UNRWA-Hamas scandal broke and Commissioner General Lazzarini continues to mislead the UN agency's donor countries. In late June, five months after he was first informed that UNRWA employees took part in the October 7th massacre in Israel, Lazzarini stated for the first time that "membership in any militant or armed group or entity is prohibited" for UNRWA staff.

This statement is not only too late, but also far too little. Here is why:

Such clarification is required since only recently the UN's humanitarian chief stated that for the UN "Hamas is not a terrorist group — it is a political movement." This view renders Lazzarini's statement meaningless. He should clarify explicitly that UNRWA prohibits membership of Hamas, leaving no room for other interpretations. By doing so, he would align himself with the Colonna Report which named Hamas and Islamic Jihad as militant groups.

The revised UNRWA staff rules (revised in June) do not even define membership in an armed group as a "serious misconduct", for which the Commissioner General has the authority to dismiss employees. Had Lazzarini been serious, he would have stated clearly that members in such groups will be dismissed from UNRWA, full stop.

The "Action Plan" presented by UNRWA to its donors did not contain steps to identify and dismiss employees who are members of armed groups. It only included adding "mandatory questions regarding outside and political activities" during the recruitment process and some revisions in the wording of hiring contracts. In other words, nothing was put in place to prevent UNRWA from employing members of armed groups other than those who come forward and confess being as such.

Israel shares sensitive intelligence only with its closest intelligence partners (and did so regarding UNRWA as well). It is up to the UN to investigate its infiltration by terrorist groups instead of trying to whitewash it. Given the vociferousness with which Lazzarini and UNRWA profess a commitment to neutrality, and the gravity of the allegations, donor countries should demand swift action by UNRWA. The gap between UNRWA's pretensions of submitting its staff lists for vetting and its glaring inaction when presented with lists of terror-implicated staff must be bridged.

Lazzarini's lack of transparency in this case raises further concern that he either does not consider Hamas an armed group or lacks the will or ability to prevent Hamas members from being employed by UNRWA.

By these actions, Lazzarini continues to substantiate Israel's key argument: the UN is incapable of running a state-like enterprise in Gaza without being infiltrated by terrorist organizations. UNRWA in Gaza can and should be replaced, without hampering the humanitarian assistance. Lazzarini's statements, reform and "Action Plan" are a smoke screen. Governments and their taxpayers should not fall for them. As long as Lazzarini refuses to take action against UNRWA staff who are Hamas and PIJ operatives, donor countries that continue to fund UNRWA are indirectly funding Hamas. Simple as that.

Background

Since Hamas's savage attack against Israel on October 7th, 2023, the IDF has been operating in Gaza to eliminate Hamas's military and governance capabilities and free the Israeli hostages. During this operation, a wealth of new intelligence has been gathered on Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other terror organizations. Israeli forces have retrieved millions of documents in captured enemy material. This new intelligence exposed two related issues:

First, the involvement of United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) employees in the October 7th massacre.

Second, the deep and systemic infiltration by those terror organizations, particularly Hamas, into the ranks of UNRWA.

What Are the New Findings on UNRWA in Gaza?

The collection and analysis of the new information is still ongoing, yet it is already clear that a significant share of UNRWA's employees in Gaza serve in the ranks of Hamas and other terror organizations, including in military positions.

Israel has sent UNRWA an official letter with a list of 100 terror operatives employed by the agency with their names, ID and military ID numbers.

  • Over 10% of senior UNRWA educators in Gaza (school principals or deputy principals, directors or deputy directors of training centers) we're found to be members of Hamas or Islamic Jihad.

  • Over thirty UNRWA facilities in Gaza have been found to contain terror infrastructures such as tunnel shafts, reflecting a deeply concerning, and possibly systematic, abuse of the status of these facilities for terrorist purposes. Hamas operated a high-end server farm directly under UNRWA's Gaza headquarters, with communication and electricity cables connecting both compounds.

Intelligence shows that Hamas considers UNRWA an essential asset both for maintaining its rule over Gaza and for exploiting its facilities to build terror infrastructure. It is not a case of "a few rotten apples", as some have tried to portray it.

Multiple times in the past, Israel provided UNRWA with information on members of Hamas that are employed by the agency, yet no action was taken.

What Did Israel Do with the Information?

In January, as the full details we're still being gathered, Israel discretely shared the initial details with UNRWA's High Commissioner, Phillipe Lazzarini. This included the names of twelve UNRWA employees, who had been identified at the time as having participated in the October 7th massacre.

Subsequently, the UN Secretary General ordered an investigation by the UN's Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) strictly on the involvement of those twelve employees in the October 7th massacre. In addition, the Secretary General appointed an external Review Group to examine UNRWA's neutrality mechanisms, chaired by Former French Foreign Minister, Catherine Colonna. In early March, both bodies visited Israel where they received detailed briefings and information, including raw intelligence, exposing the full depth and breadth of the terror infiltration into UNRWA.

In parallel, the information was shared with Israel's intelligence partners and was presented to the relevant officials in UNRWA's donor countries.

The often-repeated claim that Israel did not share information on the UNRWA-Hamas nexus is entirely false.

UNRWA in Gaza Is Beyond Repair

As the new revelations on UNRWA we're being gathered, and following a thorough inter-agency assessment, Israel concluded that the terror infiltration into UNRWA's Gaza operations poses a grave security risk and seriously jeopardizes the humanitarian efforts. Furthermore, it was concluded that the problem cannot be fixed by reforms or the introduction of new "neutrality mechanisms" in UNRWA, for two key reasons:

First, contrary to most of the donor governments, UNRWA — like the UN itself — does not regard Hamas as a terrorist organization. As recently as February 2024, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Martin Griffiths publicly stated that "Hamas is not a terrorist group — for us, as you know, it is a political movement." Moreover, reforms will not change the basic fact that UNRWA in Gaza is the only UN entity in the world which runs a state-like enterprise employing 13,000 local staff members, managed by a small number of international staff, in an area controlled by a terrorist organization with a genocidal agenda (the Hamas Charter openly states that: "Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it"). UNRWA has yet to show any inclination to investigate the affiliation of over 2000 of its staff in Hamas and other terrorist organizations, nor to dismiss them. It also has not declared whether it considers employing Hamas militants as a breach of its neutrality.

Secondly, over the past decade UNRWA announced various reforms and new "mechanisms" ostensibly aimed at ensuring its neutrality to address public scandals and concerns by donors. However, an analysis of those measures shows that they we're ineffectual and never fully implemented. This reflects either a lack of will or a lack of ability to apply steps which effectively prevent terror infiltration. For example, UNRWA boasts of conducting quarterly "neutrality inspection" of its facilities, yet those checks, conducted by local staff (who may or may not be Hamas members), according to UNRWA's own website, look only for political slogans in posters and graffiti, not for any evidence of abuse by terrorist organizations:

"Installation inspections include checks for: (i) proper use and placement of signage, including: flags, UN sign/logo, no weapons sign; (ii) ensuring that the building is free of political slogans, flags, posters and other markings; (iii) a short questionnaire for the installation manager on any experiences related to incursions, unauthorized activity and harassment of staff..."

A neutrality breach according to UNRWA's definition is "taking sides in hostilities or engaging in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature." Infiltration by a terror organization that then exploits UNRWA facilities to further their terror organization's objectives goes far beyond a mere neutrality breach. It undermines all other humanitarian principles, including humanity, impartiality and independence. UNRWA's attempt to frame the issue as merely one concerning neutrality is misleading and points to ineffective solutions. Preventing terror infiltration of such massive enterprises requires tools that UN agencies in the field do not have, starting with the ability to define local terrorist organizations as such.

UNRWA Can Be Replaced in Gaza Gradually Without Hampering the Humanitarian Effort

After the exposure of the extent of terrorist infiltration of UNRWA, Israel's humanitarian policy has been to shift focus to working with responsible aid organizations that aren't compromised by terrorist organizations. The priority has been to do so without hampering the goal of increasing and improving the humanitarian assistance provided to the civilian population in Gaza. This policy was devised and approved after a thorough assessment of UNRWA's role in the humanitarian effort and its functioning since October 7th. The assessment concluded as follows:

Hamas, a designated terrorist organization, has repeatedly demonstrated that it prioritizes terror over the wellbeing of Gazan civilians. It exploits them as human shields and views a humanitarian crisis as an integral part of their war strategy. The effectiveness of the humanitarian efforts in Gaza, and the safety of the people involved in it, requires their complete delinking from Hamas. Unfortunately, the UN's and UNRWA's leadership have chosen to understate the severity of this unprecedented scandal, leading to what might go down as one of the biggest whitewashes in the history of the United Nations.

Pursuant to these assessments, Israel is effecting a graduated replacement of UNRWA in Gaza, without hampering the humanitarian effort.

Both UN Review Processes Cannot Offer a Path to Safely Resume Funding to UNRWA in Gaza

The two reviews have very strict and limited terms of reference (TORs). The OIOS has been mandated to investigate only the involvement of the initial twelve UNRWA employees whose names we're provided in January. The Review Group chaired by Ms. Colonna has been explicitly instructed by the TOR given to it by the Secretary General not to investigate any allegations of breaches of neutrality by UNRWA "nor make any findings of fact in respect of them." Its mandate is limited to examining UNRWA's internal mechanisms to preserve its neutrality. Furthermore, it does not intend to examine whether UNRWA's reports and public communications abide by the principles of neutrality and impartiality.

To summarize, both review processes lack the mandate and the expertise to provide donors with answers to the following questions.

Israel's assessment has resulted in affirmative answers to all questions.

It is therefore up to governments, parliaments and the public in donor countries to make their own assessments and answer those questions before the flow of taxpayers' money to UNRWA, and through it to Hamas, continues.

Israel is willing to engage and provide all the information that can help such a process.

Q&A Following the Report of the Review Group on UNRWA

Q: Did the Review Group examine Israel's claims regarding UNRWA's penetration by terror groups?

The Review Group's mandate explicitly prevented it from investigating allegations of breaches of neutrality or making findings of fact regarding them.

Q: Did the Review Group find that Israel did not share evidence substantiating its allegations against UNRWA?

No. Israel shared extensive intelligence with UNRWA, the UN Secretary-General, and donor countries.

Q: So did Israel share evidence on its allegations on the UNRWA-Hamas linkage or not?

Yes. Israel shared detailed intelligence including names, IDs, and military ID numbers of UNRWA employees involved with terrorist organizations.

Q: What is the Review Group's position on UNRWA's employment of members of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)?

The Review Group noted that employment by UNRWA of Hamas or Islamic Jihad members would be a violation of the principle of neutrality.

Q: Is it true that "the Israeli Government has not informed UNRWA of any concerns relating..."?

No. Israel has repeatedly shared concerns and intelligence with UNRWA regarding terrorist infiltration.

Q: Are the Review Group's recommendations sufficient for addressing UNRWA's terror infiltration?

No. The recommendations are limited to examining internal mechanisms and do not address the actual employment of terrorists.

Q: Did the Review Group adequately address the abuse of UNRWA facilities for terrorist purposes?

No. The Review Group's mandate did not include investigating abuse of facilities for terrorist purposes.

Q: What do the Review Group's findings say on UNRWA's independence?

The Review Group's report does not adequately address how UNRWA can maintain independence while employing members of terrorist organizations.

Q: Did the Review Group properly address the issue of incitement?

No. The Review Group did not examine incitement in UNRWA educational materials.

Q: Did the Review Group examine UNRWA's mechanisms for maintaining the neutrality of its public communications?

No. The Review Group's mandate explicitly excluded examination of public communications.

Israel's Analysis of UNRWA's High-Level Action Plan for Implementation of the Colonna Report Recommendations

  1. UNRWA published (May 13, 2024) a High-Level Action Plan for implementation of the recommendations contained in the Colonna report (submitted to the UN Secretary-General on April 22, 2024).

This action plan focuses on what UNRWA calls "quick wins," those actions within UNRWA's control that can be implemented in the short term with minimal or no additional financial resources required. However, despite the grave allegations concerning the massive infiltration of Hamas into the ranks of UNRWA-Gaza, and despite the clear position of Colonna's report, which stated that employment by UNRWA of Hamas or Islamic Jihad members would be a violation of the principle of neutrality, UNRWA's action plan completely ignores the most crucial issue — how to tackle the problem of massive employment of terrorist operatives in UNRWA-Gaza. In this, it utterly fails.

  1. UNRWA's action plan does not mention Hamas in any way, nor the massive infiltration of terrorist operatives into the ranks of UNRWA.

Therefore, no concrete suggestions are made regarding what to do with those terrorist operatives. No commitment is made to fire members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad employed by UNRWA; no statement is made about not employing such individuals in the future; no real suggestions are made on how to deal with the use of UNRWA facilities for military purposes. In addition, no real action on the issue of incitement in the textbooks is proposed (thus, UNRWA remains dependent on the goodwill of the Palestinian Authority on this issue). The Action Plan includes mainly cosmetic recommendations that mostly deal with structural changes in the organization and its working methods, without addressing the deeper problems.

  1. On the neutrality of staff

UNRWA concurred with Colonna's recommendations that the existing mechanisms on this issue should be strengthened, "while recognizing the role of the host countries and of Israel". However, adding "mandatory questions regarding outside and political activities" during the recruitment process or refining the wording in the hiring contracts are not a real solution that would prevent the employment of members of terrorist organizations. It should be emphasized that thus far, despite several requests on the part of Israel, UNRWA has not provided Israel with a digital list of its employees that includes their exact places of employment, including the addresses of these workplaces. Moreover, the action plan includes no vetting in advance (i.e., prior to the hiring of the employee) and not after the fact. For the time being there is no agreed upon vetting mechanism between Israel and UNRWA, and it seems that UNRWA's action plan intends to keep it this way. The Action Plan does not include any commitment by UNRWA to dismiss members of Hamas and Islamic Jihad or not to employ them in the future.

  1. On the neutrality of installations,

it must be clear that "strengthening the questionnaire for assessments of installations" or providing infographics on this issue, as suggested by the action plan, will not prevent Hamas from using UNRWA's facilities for their purposes. The only solution is to ensure from the outset that no Hamas or PIJ operatives are employed by UNRWA and to dismiss the existing ones who are currently employed by the agency. The Action Plan ignores the fact that several UNRWA school principals are Hamas operatives, including some who are part of the Nukhba, the elite force of Hamas, that led the massacre of October 7.

  1. On the issue of education, one cannot ignore the fact that four well-known independent NGOs and research centers have concluded that UNRWA's textbook and education system are suffused with incitement against Jews and Israelis.

Therefore, "inviting Host countries to review the textbooks", as suggested in UNRWA's action plan, is like turning a blind eye to reality. Moreover, continuing the dialogue with the Palestinian Authority "to review issues of concern related to UN values and UNESCO standards" has already proven futile, since no progress has been made over the years. As mentioned in Colonna's report, the fact that the textbooks are issued by the PA "does not relieve UNRWA of its responsibilities when these textbooks are used in UNRWA or UNRWA-funded schools. UNRWA needs to implement a zero-tolerance policy on this issue". While Colonna's report makes it clear that it is up to UNRWA to take action concerning this matter and prevent incitement in its textbooks and school system, UNRWA's action plan tries once again to transfer the responsibility to host countries. The most basic step — a decision not to use textbooks that include incitement, glorification of terrorism or anti-Semitism — is simply absent. Moreover, the continued employment of teachers, school principals and deputy school principals who are members of the terrorist organizations Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad, guarantees the continued incitement in UNRWA's school system.

However, UNRWA's action plan once again completely disregards this problem.

What Happened in Israel on October 7

  • Update 22/12/24: key developments this month
  • Update 30/9/24: CONFIRMED — Hamas commander in Lebanon doubled as UNRWA school principal
  • Update 6/8/24: UN probe confirms participation of UNRWA staff in 7.10 massacre
  • Update 31/7/2024: Lazzarini's empty statement on membership in "armed groups"
  • Update 14/7/2024: Exposed: UNRWA educators who are Hamas/PIJ operatives
  • Update 11/7/24: Israel sent UNRWA a list of 100 terrorists it employs
  • Update 26/6/24: Latest statistics show decline in UNRWA's share of aid deliveries to Gaza in May
  • Update 29/5/24: Israel's Analysis of UNRWA's High-Level Action Plan for Implementation of the Colonna report recommendations
  • Update 26/4/24: Q&A following the report of the Review Group on UNRWA